300. Same Name, Wrong Path

Hello everyone!

We talked about how adversaries masquarade malicious files a few times already, but let's look at another qurious case of COM Hijacking (T1546.015).

By adding a malicious entry under HKCU that points a CLSID to their DLL, attackers cause normal system processes to load that malicious DLL.

In this case, overrode the CLSID for twinapi.dll ({AA509086-5Ca9-4C25-8F95-589D3C07B48A}), forcing system processes and web browsers to load the attacker’s DLL.

We can hunt for loading twinapi.dll from uncommon locations:

event_type: "imageloadwin"

AND

file_name: "twinapi.dll"

AND NOT

file_path: ("windows\\system32" OR "windows\\syswow64")

See you tomorrow!

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