411. Ransomware Actors Control Systems in Safe Mode Using AnyDesk

Hello everyone!

As you probably know, the Modify Registry (T1112) technique allows attackers to accomplish a wide range of objectives throughout the attack lifecycle. Today, we’ll take a look at another interesting example.

To bypass existing security controls, the ransomware actors - this time Akira (Neon Wolf) - once again took advantage of Windows Safe Mode. But the attackers needed a way to control the compromised system. For this, they used AnyDesk. To ensure that it would be launched even after rebooting into Safe Mode, they made the following registry modification:

"C:\Windows\system32\reg.exe" add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Network\AnyDesk /ve /d Service

Since this activity takes place immediately before the ransomware deployment begins, it may be the last opportunity to prevent damage. For example, it is worth monitoring for suspicious modifications to the relevant registry key:

event_type: "registryvaluesetwin"

AND

reg_key_path: "safeboot"

See you soon!

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